

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 011038
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:MSTERNER:JD
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON,JR.
S/S-O:LFLEISCHER

-----017739 150412Z /75

O 150359Z JAN 78 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 011038

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, IS, EG

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOUR MEETING WITH SADAT JANUARY
15

1. WHEN YOU SEE SADAT, YOU SHOULD MAKE FOLLOWING COMMENTS
TO HIM.

2. IT WAS DISAPPOINTMENT TO SECRETARY TO HAVE TO POSTPONE
HIS ARRIVAL IN JERUSALEM BUT HE IS CONVINCED IT WAS BEST
THING TO DO. SECRETARY IS HOPEFUL AGENDA DIFFICULTLY CAN
NOW BE EXPEDITIOUSLY RESOLVED. HE REMAINS READY TO GO TO
JERUSALEM AS SOON AS DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS
CAN BEGIN.

3. AFTER YOUR EXCHANGES WITH MUBARAK LAST NIGHT, WE ASKED
LEWIS TO CONVEY TO ISRAELIS SADAT'S RESPONSE TO ALTERNATIVES
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 011038

POSED BY BEGIN AND SECRETARY'S DECISION TO POSTPONE TRIP.
LEWIS SPENT 40 MINUTES ON TELEPHONE WITH BEGIN AT 3 A.M.
LAST NIGHT. BEGIN WANTS TO RESOLVE PROBLEM BUT SINCE HE
REACHED DECISION JANUARY 14 IN CONSULTATION WITH CABINE,
COLLEAGUES, HE NOW FEELS HE MUST DISCUSS ANY CHANGES WITH
THEM. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING DAYAN WILL ATTEMPT TO
PERSUADE BEGIN AND CABINET TO ACCEPT SHORTENED VERSION

OF HIS EARLIER SUGGESTED FORMULATION FOR ITEM B OF AGENDA
(PARA 4, TEL AVIV 657).

4. THIS WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS: '(B) THE GUIDELINES FOR
NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ISSUES."
WE BELIEVE THIS IS NEUTRAL FORMULATION WHICH WE HOPE T;AT
SADAT WILL BE ABLE TO ACCEPT (PLEASE ASCERTAIN WHETHER,
IF ISRAELI CABINET CAN ACCEPT THIS FORMULATION, IT WOULD
ALSO BE ACCEPTABLE TO SADAT.) BEGIN IS CONSULTING CABINET
JANUARY 15 AND WE HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO REACH QUICK
AGREEMENT SO THAT CONFERENCE MIGHT CONVENE TUESDAY
MORNING. WE BELIEVE SECRETARY'S DECISION HAS BEEN
HELPFUL IN CATALYZING ISRAELI ATTENTION TO WHAT IS
REQUIRED TO RESOLVE ISSUE.

5. YOU SHOULD ALSO REVIEW WITH SADAT ITEM (C) ON WHICH
THERE IS AGREEMENT AND SHORTENED VERSION OF (A) WHICH WE
ALSO HOPE WILL POSE NO DIFFICULTIES FOR SADAT. WITH
RESPECT TO CHANGE IN (A) FROM THAT OF OUR PREVIOUS
SUGGESTION, WE CONSIDER THAT REFERENCE TO "COMPREHENSIVE
PEACE SETTLEMENT" COVERS AND PERMITS DISCUSSION OF POINTS
IN EARLIER DRAFT (STATE 5218) CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL,
BORDERS, AND SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. THUS,
CHANGE FROM EARLIER DRAFT IS ONE OF LANGUAGE, NOT CONTENT.

6. WITH RESPECT TO BRIEF PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH WE HAVE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 011038

ISSUED ANNOUNCING POSTPONEMENT (SEPTTEL), SECRETARY DID
NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE FRUITFUL TO POINT FINGER OF BLAME
AT ONE SIDE OR OTHER, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF IMMINENT
CABINET MEETING OFFERING PROSPECT THAT PROBLEM MAY BE
RESOLVED. WE HOPE FOR SAME REASON THAT ANY PUBLIC
STATEMENTS THAT MAY BE ISSUED BY GOE WILL BE SIMILARLY
FRAMED IN MANNER WITH POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION
BY ISRAELIS IN MIND.

7. MORE BROADLY, WE ARE CONCERNED BY RECENT SPATE OF
PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY BOTH SIDES WHICH SEEM TO BE CAUSING
DETERIORATION IN ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. WE
HOPE SADAT AND ISRAELIS CAN HOLD OFF ANY FURTHER PUBLIC
STATEMENTS CASTING DOUBT ON OTHER'S MOTIVES AND CONCEN-
TRATE EFFORTS ON RESOLVING AGENDA DIFFICULTY AND GETTING
NEGOTIATIONS GOING IN JERUSALEM.

8. WHILE WE HOPE AGENDA PROBLEM CAN BE EXPEDITIOUSLY
RESOLVED ON SUNDAY, SECRETARY URGES SADAT IN ANY EVENT
TO SEND EGYPTIAN DELEGATION TO JERUSALEM AS SCHEDULED
FOR PURPOSE OF FINDING WAY AROUND IMPASSE. HE BELIEVES
IT IMPORTANT THAT TWO SIDES CONTINUE EFFORTS TO RESOLVE

THEIR PROBLEM AND THAT THERE NOT BE PUBLIC APPEARANCE
OF COLLAPSE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

9. FYI. AS POSTSCRIPT TO ABOVE, DINITZ HAS JUST CALLED
ATHERTON TO SAY THAT DAYAN BELIEVES HE WILL HAVE BETTER
CHANCE OF SELLING HIS REFORMULATION TO CABINET IF IT USES
LANGUAGE "GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATION OF JUDEA, SAMARIA
AND GAZA ISSUES." ATHERTON SAID IN HIS VIEW REFERENCE
TO JUDEA AND SAMARIA WOULD CAUSE MAJOR PROBLEM FOR
SADAT AND URGED DAYAN STICK TO "WEST BANK AND GAZA"
LANGUAGE. DINITZ SAID PERHAPS SOLUTION UOULD BE TO USE
FOOTNOTES OR BRACKETS TO INCLUDE BOTH EGYPTIAN AND
ISRAELI TERMINOLOGY. WE LEAVE IT TO YOU W;ETHER TO
FORESHADOW THIS POSSIBLE ,ROBLEM FOR SADAT. END FYI.
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 011038

10. FOR TEL AVIV: IF YOU THINK IT WILL DO ANY GOOD,
PLEASE REAFFIRM TO DAYAN ATHERTON'S CAUTION TO DINITZ
ABOUT COMPLICATIONS THAT WILL ARISE IF HE SWITCHES FROM
"WEST BANK" TO "JUDEA AND SAMARIA" TERMINOLOGY.

11. WITH RESPECT TO SADAT'S QUERY ABOUT STATEMENT BY
PRESIDENT CARTER ON SETTLEMENTS, WE ARE SENDING TO YOU
BY SEPTEL TEXT OF THIS PORTION OF PRESIDENT'S INTERVIEW
WHICH YOU CAN USE TO SET RECORD STRAIGHT WITH SADAT.

VANCE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 011038
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:S/S-O:SVALERGA

APPROVED BY:S/S-O:SVALERGA

-----018178 151037Z /10

O 151015Z JAN 78 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 011038

NODIS
FOR BRZEZINSKI ONLY

FOL STATE 011038 SENT ACTION CAIRO INFO TEL AVIV JAN 15, 1978
REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

S E C R E T STATE 011038

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, IS, EG

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOUR MEETING WITH SADAT JANUARY
15

1. WHEN YOU SEE SADAT, YOU SHOULD MAKE FOLLOWING COMMENTS
TO HIM.

2. IT WAS DISAPPOINTMENT TO SECRETARY TO HAVE TO POSTPONE
HIS ARRIVAL IN JERUSALEM BUT HE IS CONVINCED IT WAS BEST
THING TO DO. SECRETARY IS HOPEFUL AGENDA DIFFICULTLY CAN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 011038

NOW BE EXPEDITIOUSLY RESOLVED. HE REMAINS READY TO GO TO
JERUSALEM AS SOON AS DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS
CAN BEGIN.

3. AFTER YOUR EXCHANGES WITH MUBARAK LAST NIGHT, WE ASKED
LEWIS TO CONVEY TO ISRAELIS SADAT'S RESPONSE TO ALTERNATIVES
POSED BY BEGIN AND SECRETARY'S DECISION TO POSTPONE TRIP.
LEWIS SPENT 40 MINUTES ON TELEPHONE WITH BEGIN AT 3 A.M.
LAST NIGHT. BEGIN WANTS TO RESOLVE PROBLEM BUT SINCE HE
REACHED DECISION JANUARY 14 IN CONSULTATION WITH CABINET,
COLLEAGUES, HE NOW FEELS HE MUST DISCUSS ANY CHANGES WITH
THEM. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING DAYAN WILL ATTEMPT TO
PERSUADE BEGIN AND CABINET TO ACCEPT SHORTENED VERSION
OF HIS EARLIER SUGGESTED FORMULATION FOR ITEM B OF AGENDA
(PARA 4, TEL AVIV 657).

4. THIS WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS: '(B) THE GUIDELINES FOR
NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ISSUES."
WE BELIEVE THIS IS NEUTRAL FORMULATION WHICH WE HOPE THAT
SADAT WILL BE ABLE TO ACCEPT (PLEASE ASCERTAIN WHETHER,
IF ISRAELI CABINET CAN ACCEPT THIS FORMULATION, IT WOULD

ALSO BE ACCEPTABLE TO SADAT.) BEGIN IS CONSULTING CABINET JANUARY 15 AND WE HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO REACH QUICK AGREEMENT SO THAT CONFERENCE MIGHT CONVENE TUESDAY MORNING. WE BELIEVE SECRETARY'S DECISION HAS BEEN HELPFUL IN CATALYZING ISRAELI ATTENTION TO WHAT IS REQUIRED TO RESOLVE ISSUE.

5. YOU SHOULD ALSO REVIEW WITH SADAT ITEM (C) ON WHICH THERE IS AGREEMENT AND SHORTENED VERSION OF (A) WHICH WE ALSO HOPE WILL POSE NO DIFFICULTIES FOR SADAT. WITH RESPECT TO CHANGE IN (A) FROM THAT OF OUR PREVIOUS SUGGESTION, WE CONSIDER THAT REFERENCE TO "COMPREHENSIVE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 011038

PEACE SETTLEMENT COVERS AND PERMITS DISCUSSION OF POINTS IN EARLIER DRAFT (STATE 5218) CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL, BORDERS, AND SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. THUS, CHANGE FROM EARLIER DRAFT IS ONE OF LANGUAGE, NOT CONTENT.

6. WITH RESPECT TO BRIEF PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH WE HAVE ISSUED ANNOUNCING POSTPONEMENT (SEPTTEL), SECRETARY DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE FRUITFUL TO POINT FINGER OF BLAME AT ONE SIDE OR OTHER, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF IMMINENT CABINET MEETING OFFERING PROSPECT THAT PROBLEM MAY BE RESOLVED. WE HOPE FOR SAME REASON THAT ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT MAY BE ISSUED BY GOE WILL BE SIMILARLY FRAMED IN MANNER WITH POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION BY ISRAELIS IN MIND.

7. MORE BROADLY, WE ARE CONCERNED BY RECENT SPATE OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY BOTH SIDES WHICH SEEM TO BE CAUSING DETERIORATION IN ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. WE HOPE SADAT AND ISRAELIS CAN HOLD OFF ANY FURTHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS CASTING DOUBT ON OTHER'S MOTIVES AND CONCENTRATE EFFORTS ON RESOLVING AGENDA DIFFICULTY AND GETTING NEGOTIATIONS GOING IN JERUSALEM.

8. WHILE WE HOPE AGENDA PROBLEM CAN BE EXPEDITIOUSLY RESOLVED ON SUNDAY, SECRETARY URGES SADAT IN ANY EVENT TO SEND EGYPTIAN DELEGATION TO JERUSALEM AS SCHEDULED FOR PURPOSE OF FINDING WAY AROUND IMPASSE. HE BELIEVES IT IMPORTANT THAT TWO SIDES CONTINUE EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THEIR PROBLEM AND THAT THERE NOT BE PUBLIC APPEARANCE OF COLLAPSE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

9. FYI. AS POSTSCRIPT TO ABOVE, DINITZ HAS JUST CALLED ATHERTON TO SAY THAT DAYAN BELIEVES HE WILL HAVE BETTER CHANCE OF SELLING HIS REFORMULATION TO CABINET IF IT USES LANGUAGE "GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATION OF JUDEA, SAMARIA AND GAZA ISSUES." ATHERTON SAID IN HIS VIEW REFERENCE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 011038

TO JUDEA AND SAMARIA WOULD CAUSE MAJOR PROBLEM FOR
SADAT AND URGED DAYAN STICK TO "WEST BANK AND GAZA"
LANGUAGE. DINITZ SAID PERHAPS SOLUTION UOULD BE TO USE
FOOTNOTES OR BRACKETS TO INCLUDE BOTH EGYPTIAN AND
ISRAELI TERMINOLOGY. WE LEAVE IT TO YOU W;ETHER TO
FORESHADOW THIS POSSIBLE ,ROBLEM FOR SADAT. END FYI.

10. FOR TEL AVIV: IF YOU THINK IT WILL DO ANY GOOD,
PLEASE REAFFIRM TO DAYAN AHERTON'S CAUTION TO DINITZ
ABOUT COMPLICATIONS THAT WILL ARISE IF HE SWITCHES FROM
"WEST BANK" TO "JUDEA AND SAMARIA" TERMINOLOGY.

11. WITH RESPECT TO SADAT'S QUERY ABOUT STATEMENT BY
PRESIDENT CARTER ON SETTLEMENTS, WE ARE SENDING TO YOU
BY SEPTTEL TEXT OF THIS PORTION OF PRESIDENT'S INTERVIEW
WHICH YOU CAN USE TO SET RECORD STRAIGHT WITH SADAT.
VANCE
UNQUOTE VANCE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: INSTRUCTIONS, MEETING AGENDA, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, MEETINGS, VISITS, MINISTERIAL VISITS, PEACE TALKS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 15 jan 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE011038
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: MSTERNER:JD
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P840148-1465
Format: TEL
From: STATE NEA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780162/aaaabzxm.tel
Line Count: 302
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 839f63e3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 31 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3772718
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOUR MEETING WITH SADAT JANUARY 15
TAGS: PGOV, OVIP, IS, EG, US, (SADAT, ANWAR), (VANCE, CYRUS R)
To: CAIRO TEL AVIV
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/839f63e3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014